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childbearing decisions in Italy. Since having children is in most cases a “couple matter”, the 
analysis accounts for the characteristics of both the possible parents. Our results do not 
support established theoretical predictions according to which the increase in the 
opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher female labour participation is 
responsible for the fall in fertility. On the contrary, the instability of the women’s work status 
(i.e. their being occasional, precarious, and low-paid workers) reveals to be a significant 
dissuasive deterrent discouraging the decision to have children. Couples with unemployed 
women are less likely to plan childbearing as well. Other relevant explanatory variables are 
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the analysis accounts for the characteristics of both the possible parents. Our results do 
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1. Introduction 
Sometime in the next few years (if it hasn’t happened already) the world will reach a milestone: half 
of humanity will be having only enough children to replace itself. That is, the fertility rate of half 
countries will be 2.1 or below, making the growth of their population slow down and eventually 
stabilize. This is not necessarily a bad news. According to the United Nations Population Division 
(2009), fast population growth, fueled by high fertility, hinders the reduction of poverty and the 
achievement of other development goals. However, in countries experiencing a dramatic population 
ageing like Italy, the fall in fertility brings about some worrying side effects. First, low fertility 
substantially reduces the size of the labour force. Second, the decline in the workforce blights the 
actuarial sustainability of the current pension system. Furthermore, with very low fertility, the fall 
in the labour supply is most severe at the young ages. Young workers are the main assimilators of 
new technology, and countries that have a shortage of young skilled workers are more vulnerable to 
competition (McDonald, 2008, McDonald and Temple, 2006). 
Theory commonly relates the fall in fertility to the rise of female participation to the labour market 
(Willis, 1973, Becker, 1981, Cigno, 1991). In the 70s, consistently with such predictions, the higher 
level of education, and the related prospects of better work positions and higher earnings, raised the 
opportunity cost of not working, thereby causing a postponement of childbearing decisions in turn 
leading to a fall in fertility rates (Adsera, 2004, D’Addio and D’Ercole, 2005).  
However, the relationship between female participation and fertility has changed significantly in the 
last two decades. In most EU countries, the sign of the correlation has now become positive (Ahn 
and Mira, 2002, Morgan, 2003, Engelhardt et al., 2004, Billari and Kohler, 2004; for an alternative 
view see Kögel, 2004). Still, the shift does not concern Italy, which, despite having one of the 
lowest female participation rates in Europe, still suffers from a markedly lower fertility. The Italian 
exception  has  been  explained  as  the  result  of  institutional  and  policy  differences  in  respect  to 
Nordic countries where more generous protection schemes have been implemented to reconcile 
motherhood with work (Bernhardt, 1993, Gauthier, 1996, Adsera, 2004, Engelhardt and Prskawetz, 
2004, Del Boca and Sauer, 2009).  
The empirical literature investigating the fall in fertility focuses almost only on women’s economic 
conditions and on actual fertility rates, somewhat neglecting the facts that: 1) in EU countries, the 
desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual rate (Eurostat, 2001, Adsera, 2006). 2) 
Family planning decisions are in most cases – as the term itself suggests - a family matter or, better, 
a “couple-matter”.   3 
Here we argue that, besides female participation, on the one side, and the pressure of the “biological 
clock” and of social and cultural factors, on the other side, one of the main issues which a woman 
addresses when planning the decision to have a child is: can we – i.e. my partner and me - afford it? 
Thus, rather than analyzing the labour market participation only of women - which has already been 
fruitfully addressed by a series of previous studies – we aim at adding some new insights to the 
debate by focusing on the “economic sustainability” of childbearing decisions at the family level. 
This choice is also related to the fact that, in very most cases, childbearing is conceived in the 
context of a steady relationship. In Italy, aspiring single mothers and fathers are in fact still quite 
rare and, in some case, even thwarted by law. 
The empirical studies tracing back the differences between Northern and Southern Europe to the  
institutional framework of female participation reasonably account for social policies related to 
childcare assistance, parental leave arrangements, and the availability of part-time positions for 
women.  Besides  few  exceptions  (see  for  example  Adsera,  2004),  the  stability  of  the  aspiring 
parents’ work status or, in other words, their “labour precariousness”, has so far been neglected. It is 
worth noting that the concept of labour precariousness is in general disregarded by the conventional 
literature, which considers it more as an obvious and somewhat desirable side effect of flexibility 
rather than as a crucial factor of workers’ well-being. 
In this paper, together with a series of conventional socio-economic factors already considered by 
previous studies, like for example employment and marriage, we test the role of new labour market-
related variables which may influence the economic sustainability of the decision to have children. 
In particular, we focus on the stability of the work status. The main hypothesis we want to test here 
is that having a precarious job (i.e. unstable, low paid, and with scarce guarantees) is a dissuasive 
deterrent from planning parenthood, instead of encouraging childbearing through a decrease in its 
opportunity cost for women.   
Then, we carry out a first exploration of the role of the strength of family ties, or what the literature 
generally  refers  to  as  “bonding  social  capital”.  Social  capital  has  in  fact  been  proven  to  be  a 
significant variable for the explanation of differences in the agents’ behaviour across the Italian 
regions (Heliwell and Putnam, 1995, Guiso et al., 2004, Peri, 2004, Sabatini, 2008). 
Raw data are drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the 
Bank of Italy which covers 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 income-
earners. Social capital is measured by latent indicators synthesized through principal component 
analyses performed on survey data collected by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat) in 
2006. Relevant territorial indicators are taken from several other national data sources including the 
Istat’s Quarterly survey on the labour force.   4 
Based on probit models, our results contradict conventional economic theory predicting that the 
increase in the opportunity cost of motherhood connected to higher participation and wage rates 
necessarily leads to a decrease in fertility. Rather, we find evidence that being unemployed is a 
significant deterrent from planning to have children. More in general, women's labour instability 
discourages  childbearing  aspirations.  Couples  where  women  are  precarious  (i.e.  atypical, 
temporary, and low-guaranteed) workers are in fact much less likely to plan to have children in the 
future. 
Other relevant explanatory variables are age (both of men and women), current family size, the 
perceived economic well-being of the family, and the strength of family ties. 
The  remainder  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  In  the  next  section  we  offer  a  synthetic 
background on Italy. We then describe our data and present a series of probit models. First, we test 
some traditional explanations of family planning decisions. Then, we introduce dummy measures of 
the precariousness of work status as new, main, explanatory variables. Finally, we test the influence 
of bonding social capital. We conclude by considering the policy lessons of the Italian case. 
 
2. Background  
The relationship between education, labour market participation, and fertility has changed over 
time. Until the second half of the 80s, higher levels of female education and labour participation 
were associated with lower fertility rates. Starting from the 90s, these correlations were partially 
reversed. The participation of women to the labour market continued to increase in all countries, but 
fertility rates started to decline at a lower rate or, in some cases, began to grow again. However, 
relevant differences can be observed. In the European Union, the countries with the lowest fertility 
(Spain, Italy, and Greece) are those with relatively low levels of female labour force participation, 
while the countries with higher fertility rates (Denmark, France, and Sweden) show a relatively high 
female participation to the labour market. Italy, especially in the Northern and Central regions, 
became the title-holder of the so-called “lowest-low” fertility (Kohler et al. 2002, Castiglioni and 
Della Zuanna, 2009). 
According to the most recent data, the average number of children per fertile woman is now 1.33 
(Istat, 2007). This is one of the lowest fertility rates in developed countries and is the result of a 
gradual decrease in fertility started at the beginning of the last century. The fall in fertility has been 
accompanied by significant changes in the chronology of the couples’ family planning choices. 
Mothers’ average age at the first childbirth, which has been quite stable around 25 for a long time, 
gradually raised to the current threshold of 29 (Istat, 2007). As a consequence, the average family 
size radically changed as well. Currently, the prevalent family model implies an only child. It is   5 
noteworthy that the event of the first childbirth has been inappreciatively influenced by the fertility 
fall: Italian women continue to show a high propensity to motherhood. It is the second childbirth 
that has become an even more rare event. The decrease in fertility cannot thus be attributed to a 
negative attitude towards procreation. This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that, according to 
the Istat’s Survey on Births (2007), the desired fertility rate is significantly higher than the actual 
one.  Such  a  background  suggests  that  further  investigations  are  required  to  understand  the 
determinants of this gap or, in other words, what curbs the couples’ ambition to conceive a second 
child. 
 
3. Main hypotheses: the importance of precariousness. 
First, we test some traditional explanations of family planning decisions advanced by the theoretical 
and empirical debate. The models presented in section 5.1 are intended to assess the influence 
exerted  on  childbearing  intentions  by  the  age,  educational  qualification,  and  labour  market 
participation of both the possible parents, as well as the couple’s marital status, the perception of the 
family’s  economic  well-being  and  the  current  family  size.  As  pointed  out  in  the  introduction, 
according to microeconomic theory female participation should lower fertility rates by raising the 
opportunity cost of motherhood (Willis, 1973, Becker, 1981, Cigno, 1991, Ermish, 2003). Until the 
first half of the 80s, this hypothesis has been supported by data. However, according to a series of 
recent  empirical  studies,  the  negative  relationship  between  female  participation  and  fertility  no 
longer holds.  
At  this  stage  of  the  analysis,  our  study  differentiates  itself  from  the  previous  literature  by:  1) 
focusing on childbearing intentions, instead of accounting solely for actual fertility, in order to 
better evaluate the determinants of the decision to have (more) children; 2) assessing at the micro 
level the possible role of a series of economic features of both the components of the couple, instead 
of focusing on women only.  
Then, in section 5.2, we test our new hypotheses by introducing measures of the precariousness of 
the aspiring parents’ work status as explanatory variables. We argue that if the aspiring parents hold 
precarious positions in the labour market - e.g. they have unstable, low-paid,  and not guaranteed 
jobs - they are less likely to have the time and the material resources for expanding their family. In 
its “Classification of Status in Employment”, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines 
“precarious”  workers  as  either:  (a)  workers  whose  contract  of  employment  leads  to  the 
classification of the incumbent as belonging to the groups of “casual workers”
1; (b) “short-term 
workers”  or  “seasonal  workers”;  or  (c)  workers  whose  contract  of  employment  will  allow  the 
                                                 
1 The ILO defines “casual”  workers as having an explicit or implicit contract of employment which is not expected to 
continue for more than a short period.    6 
employing  enterprise  or  person  to  terminate  the  contract  at  short  notice.  As  stated  in  the 
introduction, the concept of labour precariousness is generally disregarded by the  conventional 
literature, which considers it more as a side effect of flexibility rather than as a crucial, potentially 
negative, factor of workers’  well-being.  This view can be hardly  generalized to Mediterranean 
countries  like  Italy.  Here,  precarious  workers  are  generally  characterized  by  low  employment 
conditions in terms of pay, employment security, sickness and parental benefits, balance between 
work and private life. They are usually provided with less work-related training and enjoy scarce 
prospects of building a career. Moreover, such negative labour market conditions are associated 
with an unfavourable institutional and policy framework. While in Nordic countries the effects of 
flexibility on well-being are tempered by more efficient childcare systems and generous parental 
benefits,  in  Italy  public  protection  schemes  are  in  most  cases  designed  to  meet  the  needs  of 
permanent workers (see Ferrera, 2005, and Ferrera and Gualmini, 2004, for exhaustive reviews on 
the Italian welfare state)
2.  
In this study, we attempt to assess the different childbearing intentions of first job seekers and of 
unemployed, not employed, atypical, and precarious workers, as well as of self-employed workers.  
Since the high exposure to the risks of job loss, wage variability, and intermittent unemployment 
raise the uncertainty on future incomes, making difficult any form of long-term planning of life 
activities  such  as  marriage  and  procreation,  we  expect  a  negative  association  between  the 
precariousness of potential parents and their childbearing intentions. 
After the evaluation of the range of micro characteristics described above, we then try to assess the 
possible  role  of  cultural  and  economic  factors  measured  at  the  macro  level.  Some  theoretical 
studies,  often  grouped  under  the  common  label  of  second  demographic  transition  theories, 
emphasize the role of culture and social norms (Ariès, 1980, Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986, van 
de  Kaa  1987,  Lesthaeghe  and  Surkyn  1998).  This  strand  of  the  literature  attributes  the  fall  in 
fertility to a basic shift toward values emphasizing “the rights and self-fulfillment of individuals” 
(van de Kaa, 1987, p. 5). According to van der Kaa (1987), dominant views have moved away from 
traditional family-oriented values, resulting in a  relevant increase in divorce, cohabitation, and non-
marital childbearing. In this paper, we attempt to add some insights to this debate by  testing the 
influence of a cultural factor like the strength of family ties, which are often referred to by the 
literature as a form “bonding social capital”. Here, we expect stronger family ties to be associated 
                                                 
2 Labour precariousness can thus be seen as a barrier to social integration that may destroy human and social capital: a 
high  level  of  flexibility  on  employment  hinders  training  and  qualification  and,  at  the  same  time,  hampers  the 
consolidation of social ties, both inside and outside the workplace. While a stable and satisfactory work provides not 
only income, but also an identity and a “sense of belonging”, precariousness generates discouragement and distrust 
towards labour market institutions that, at the macro level, may result in a more distrustful society. In Italy, the negative 
connotation of precariousness is further testified by the worrying growth of social conflicts associated with the constant 
increase in the number of atypical and unstable workers.   7 
with  higher  levels  of  fertility.  In  our  empirical  analysis,  following  Sabatini  (2008,  2009a)  we 
discriminate between the “intensity” and the “quality” of family ties, to shed light on the possibly 
diverse effects of these two dimensions of bonding social capital.  
 
4. Data  
The paper draws upon cross-section data collected by the author on the basis of several national 
survey sources. Variables considered within the empirical analysis are in very most cases synthetic, 
latent, indicators derived from raw data through a series of methods ranging from simple recoding 
to principal component analysis (PCA)
3.  
The main source is the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) carried out by the Bank 
of Italy in 2006. The SHIW covers 7,768 households composed of 19,551 individuals and 13,009 
income-earners  and  collects  data  on  individual  income,  wealth,  human  capital  and  a  range  of 
relevant socio-economic behaviours and perceptions. In the 2006 wave of the survey, an interesting 
question  on  family  planning  was  included  in  the  questionnaire:  “Do  you  plan  to  have  (more) 
children in the future?” where possible answers were 1) yes, 2) not now, we will think about it later, 
3) No, we don’t want any (more) children, and 4) No, but we would have liked to have (more) 
children
4. The question was asked only to couples in which the woman was under 46 and offers the 
opportunity for an investigation into the socio-economic determinants of childbearing intentions at 
the micro level. 
The  sub-sample  interested  by  this  question  includes  1,742  couples,  i.e.  1,742  men  plus  1,742 
women. Responses are provided by the head of the household, who was asked to speak in the name 
of the couple. The derived dataset used for the analysis thus includes 1,742 cases, corresponding to 
the heads of  the household, to which we have attached variables describing the socio-economic 
characteristics of their (1,742) partners.  
In our view, the fact of accounting for couples, instead of considering solely women, may add 
relevant hints to the debate. The decision to have children is in fact in most cases a couple matter, 
and is influenced by the socio-economic conditions of both the partners. It is worth noting that the 
SHIW  covers  only  “conventional”  couples  formed  by  a  woman  and  a  man  living  together. 
Homosexual couples and singles are not included in the sample. Besides any ethical and political 
consideration, this choice seems to be representative of the Italian scenario. Italy is in fact usually 
regarded  as  the  European  country  with  the  strongest  family  bonds  and  religious  institutions. 
                                                 
3 Indicators are described in detail in Appendix A. More detailed techinical notes on their construction are available by 
request to the author. 
4 The questionnaire and the microdata are available on the Bank of Italy’s web site.    8 
Aspiring  single  parents,  whether  women  or  men,  are  not  only  discouraged  by  cultural  and 
ideological pressures. In some cases, they are even thwarted by law, to the point that people needing 
treatments  like  embryo  donation  and  in  vitro  fertilization  are  forced  to  refer  to  foreign  health 
facilities in neighbouring countries like France, Spain, and Switzerland (see Lalli, 2009, for an 
overview). As already outlined in section 3, Italy’s levels of divorces, non-marital cohabitations, 
and illegitimacy rates are among the lowest in Europe.  
Measures  of  social  capital  are  obtained  as  results  of  principal  component  analyses  (PCAs) 
performed on raw data aggregated at the regional level by the Istat in its Multipurpose surveys. 
Multipurpose surveys are carried out to investigate social phenomena by means of face-to-face 
interviews on a sample of 24,000 households, roughly corresponding to 50,000 individuals. Other 
territorial indicators are taken from different data sources which will be specified in Section 5.3.  
 
5. Results 
The hypotheses described in Section 3 are tested through a series of probit analyses. The dependent 
variable of the primary regression model is the response to the question: “Do you plan to have 
(more) children in the future?”. Because of the limited nature of the dependent variable, we follow 
the well-established strategy to code this as a binary model with unity assigned to the response 
“Yes” and zero to the remaining categories. 
 
5.1 Education and participation 
First, we test some conventional hypotheses addressing the role of education, labour participation, 
and civil status. Independent variables accounted for at this and in the following stages of the 
analysis are as follows: 
 
•  An indicator of women’s and men’s participation to the labour market. The index ranges from 
1 (lowest participation) to 8 (highest) and is described in detail in Table A1 in Appendix A. 
The classification takes into account two main parameters: the work status and the type of 
contract. The latter plays a fundamental role for two main reasons: a) as outlined in Section 3, 
diverse  types  of  contract  imply  strong  differences  in  terms  of    risks  of  job  loss,  wage 
variability,  intermittent  unemployment,  training  opportunities,  parental  benefits,  and  other 
guarantees; b) a difference in the type of contract may play a crucial role in determining the 
opportunity cost of childbearing as defined by microeconomic theory. 
•  An indicator of women’s and men’s educational qualification, ranging from 1 (none) to 8 
(postgraduate qualification). See Table A2 for further details.   9 
•  Men’s and women’s age, where the women’s age cannot be over 46 due to the sample design. 
•  Marital status, coded as 1 if the couple is married and 0 in all the other cases. 
•  Centre-North, a territorial dummy coded with unity if the couple lives in Northern or Central 
regions and 0 otherwise.  
•  The perceived economic conditions of the family, given by the interviewees’ response to the 
question: “Is your household’s income sufficient to see you through to the end of the month?”, 
ranging on a scale from 1 (“with great difficulty”) to 6 (“very easily”). 
 
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1, while probit estimates are described in Table 2. Detailed 
information on how variables were built are reported in Appendix A. 
As expected, the results indicate that childbearing intentions decrease with the age of both the 
partners, with the number of children already born, and for couples living in Central or Northern 
regions. Married couples are more likely to want (more) children, as well as couples where men 
hold a higher educational qualification and a better job position. Such result confirms that men do 
not generally have to face any trade-off between fatherhood and their professional career. On the 
contrary, men’s position in the labour market is likely to work as a factor reassuring the couple 
about the economic sustainability of its childbearing intentions. It is noteworthy that, even if the 
educational qualification of women is, on average, slightly higher, the gender divide in participation 
is still significant. Good perceived economic conditions are also a significant and positive predictor 
of the decision to have children. A first interesting result is that the educational qualification and the 
labour market participation of women are not significant explanatory variables. In other words, 
females’ aspirations seem not to behave as factors diminishing childbearing intentions through the 
raise in the opportunity cost of motherhood, as predicted by microeconomic theory.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Obs  Mean  St. dev  Min  Max 
Married  1742  .9535017  .2106221  0  1 
Number of children  1742  1.442021  1.000759  0  7 
Man’s age  1742  40.58783  8.425163  20  69 
Woman’s age  1742  36.52755  8.227599  18  45 
Man’s education  1742  4.058553  1.473493  0  8 
Woman’s education  1742  4.145235  1.543223  0  8 
Man’s participation  1742  5.0907  1.921741  1  8 
Woman’s participation  1742  3.352468  2.284677  1  8 
Perceived Economic well-being  1742  3.11194  1.212412  1  6 
Centre-North  1742  .6647532  .4722122  0  1 
Man’s education*participation  1742  22.00175  12.7256  1  64 
Woman’s education*participation  1742  15.47229  13.2574  1  64   10 
 
Table 2. Model results 
  Model 1  Model 2 
  Coef.  z  P > | z |  Coef.  z  P > | z | 
Married  .9918152  4.94  0.000  .7948549  3.14  0.002 
Number of children  -.598366  -11.45  0.000  -.638938  -11.64  0.000 
Man’s age  -.040702  -6.78  0.000  -.034010  -2.87  0.004 
Woman’s age  -.034837  -5.91  0.000  -.057685  -4.48  0.000 
Man’s education  .0921572  2.50  0.012       
Woman’s education  .0180198  0.48  0.631       
Man’s participation  .0590218  2.22  0.026       
Woman’s participation  -.004754  -0.22  0.826       
Perceived Economic well-being  .1175236  2.68  0.007  .2389556  2.36  0.018 
Centre-North  -.221709  -2.26  0.024  .1010039  -1.84  0.065 
Man’s education*participation        .0122577  3.00  0.003 
Woman’s education*participation        .0038389  0.45  0.654 
Observations  1742  1742 
Degrees of freedom  10  8 
Log-likelihood   -548.30758  -500.99235 
LR Chi-square  419.45  431.21 
 
 
The same results hold after the introduction, in model 2, of an interaction variable given by the 
product  between  participation  and  education.  The  educational  qualification  is  in  fact  likely  to 
influence workers’ professional ambitions helping to better define their involvement in the labour 
market.  For  example,  a  temporary  worker  holding  a  postgraduate  qualification  (e.g.  a  young 
scholar)  is  likely  to  devote  a  higher  effort  to  the  improvement  of  her  position  in  respect  to  a 
permanent worker holding a secondary school diploma (e.g. a white collar worker). The index 
ranges from 1 to 64, with higher values corresponding to greater professional expectations. Once 
again,  women’s  ambitions  seem  not  to  be  a  significant  explanatory  variable  of  the  couples’ 
childbearing intentions. 
Both the models are statistically significant because the chi-square statistics are higher than the 
critical values for 10 and 8 degrees of freedom. Goodness of fit measures are briefly discussed in 
Appendix B. The addition of other potential explanatory variables does not change the significance, 
sign and size of the estimates, neither the goodness of fit of the model. In particular, in this and in 
the following regressions, we controlled for log real income, home ownership, home’s surface, the 
fact of having debts (in particular home loans), the state of health, the sector of activity, and the 
self-declared wealth, which all proved not to be significant predictors of the couples’ childbearing 
intentions
5.   
                                                 
5 Estimates are available by request to the author.   11 
 
5.2 Precariousness 
In this section, we introduce a series of dummies to assess the possible effect of work status on 
childbearing decisions. In particular, we test the importance of being: unemployed (whether first-
job  seeker  or  not),  self-employed,  not  employed  (i.e.  homemaker,  student,  non-paid  volunteer, 
retired  or  pensioner),  atypical  worker  (i.e.  contingent  worker  on  own  account  like  occasional 
collaborator or project worker, or worker holding an unstable job with a temporary, or occasional or 
fixed term contract), and permanent worker. In model 4, we adopt a more comprehensive definition 
of precariousness by introducing a different dummy which is coded with unity in case of contingent 
workers,  employees  with  temporary  contracts  or  fixed-term  contracts,  first-job  seekers  and 
unemployed workers. Probit estimates are reported in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3. Model results 
  Model 3  Model 4 
  Coef.  z  P > | z |  Coef.  z  P > | z | 
Married  1.031179  5.06  0.000  1.011891  4.95  0.000 
Number of children  -.618677  -11.63  0.000  -.614571  -11.52  0.000 
Man’s age  -.041363  -6.72  0.000  -.041411  -6.75  0.000 
Woman’s age  -.039632  -6.47  0.000  -.040057  -6.50  0.000 
Man’s education  .101478  2.71  0.007  .11055  2.90  0.004 
Woman’s education  .0398854  1.07  0.286  .0471949  1.24  0.421 
Self-employed man  .2978011  2.50  0.012  .2527993  2.22  0.027 
Self-employed woman  -.235188  -1.43  0.152  -.251930  -1.52  0.099 
Not employed man  -.880848  -1.18  0.239  -.882865  -1.18  0.237 
Not employed woman  -.511745  -0.87  0.386  -.485806  -0.82  0.411 
Unemployed man  -.208852  -0.78  0.437       
Unemployed woman  -.463432  -2.30  0.022       
Atypical man  -.080368  -0.46  0.647       
Atypical woman  -.428590  -2.71  0.007       
Permanent man        -.168550  -0.89  0.373 
Permanent woman        -.002723  -0.01  0.992 
Precarious man        -.128732  -0.84  0.400 
Precarious woman        -.452038  -3.43  0.001 
Perceived Economic well-being  .2489144  2.55  0.011  .2724616  2.78  0.005 
Centre-North  -.237949  -2.42  0.015  -.241378  -2.46  0.014 
Observations  1742  1742 
Degrees of freedom  16  18 
Log-likelihood   -540.05429  -538.75591 
LR Chi-square  435.95  438.55 
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As in the previous regressions, having less children (or not having at all), being younger, married 
and in good economic conditions positively influence couples’ childbearing intentions.  
What  is  interesting  here  is  that,  contrarily  to  theoretical  predictions,  unemployed  women  and 
women  working  with  temporary,  atypical,  contracts  are  significantly  less  likely  to  plan  a 
motherhood. The explanation seems to be straightforward: far from being encouraged by the lower 
opportunity  cost  of  childbearing,  these  workers  probably  feel  too  precarious  to  conceive  the 
decision to have children. 
In most cases, temporary female workers with atypical contracts cannot enjoy any form of sickness 
or parental benefits. On the contrary, pregnancy is in most cases a cause of termination of the work 
relationship by the  employer.  Thus, female  atypical workers generally  have to face a trade-off 
between motherhood and their participation to the labour market. For couples in which the woman 
is  unemployed,  the  decision  to  have  a  child  is  likely  to  sound  as  simply  unsustainable.  
Interestingly,  couples  in  which  the  man  is  self-employed  show  a  higher  probability  to  plan 
childbearing. 
Similar results hold if we replace dummies for unemployed and atypical workers with the more 
comprehensive  dummy  coded  as  one  in  case  of  unemployed  or  first-job  seekers  or  temporary 
workers. Once again, being on the fringes of the labour market seems to be a significant and strong 
dissuasive deterrent against childbearing for women. Even if job instability acts as a dissuasive 
deterrent against motherhood planning, being a permanent worker seems not to be a sufficient 
condition for childbearing. Probably, once the economic emergency is overcome, further factors 
concur in affecting family planning decisions. For example, a cultural factor like bonding social 
capital also plays a role, as it will be shown in the next section.  Models 3 and 4 are statistically 
significant since the chi-square statistics are higher than the critical values for 16 and 18 degrees of 
freedom. 
 
5.3 Bonding social capital 
In this section we test the role of indicators measured at the regional level with the aim to capture 
other socio-cultural determinants of family planning decisions. In particular, we account for what 
the literature has often labelled as “bonding social capital”. The term “bonding” holds a negative 
connotation  and  refers  to  relationships  between  people  who  know  each  other  well,  i.e.,  family 
members, close friends, and neighbours (Gittel and Vidal, 1998). These relationships correspond to 
what Granovetter (1973) termed as “strong ties” and are often considered the building blocks for 
relationships with broader social networks. Starting from the pioneer study of Banfield (1958) on 
the  Italian  Mezzogiorno,  bonding  social  capital  has  been  generally  considered  as  a  factor  of   13 
backwardness and economic underdevelopment (Putnam et al., 1993, Leonardi, 1995, Degli Antoni, 
2006,  Sabatini,  2008,  2009a.  See  Woolcock  and  Narayan,  2000,  and  Sabatini,  2007,  for  an 
overview). However, strong family ties may positively affect the agents’ well-being through the 
provision of a series of services which are not accounted for by official statistics. For example, the 
family may provide young couples with fundamental services like financial help and babysitting. 
Here, we expect the strength of family ties to affect the commitment to reproduction. Following 
Sabatini (2009b), we carry out an attempt to take into account both the “intensity” and the “quality” 
of family ties. Intensity is measured through indicators of the family composition, of the spatial 
distance between family members’ places of residence, and of the frequency of the encounters. 
Adopted indicators are described in detail in Table C1 in Appendix C.  
The quality of relationships has been measured through indicators of grandparents helpfulness in 
taking care of their grandchildren, of the custom of non monetary gift exchange, and of the declared 
satisfaction with family relationships. The first indicator is aimed at capturing the strength of the 
mutual assistance mechanisms possibly taking place within the family. Gift exchange is considered 
as representative of the affection between family members. Making non monetary gifts is in fact a 
time consuming activity which requires a certain further effort to know the receiver’s tastes or 
needs.  Such  an  effort  can  hardly  prescind  from  a  good  quality  of  relationships.  Indicators  are 
described in detail in Table C2, Appendix C. All the raw measures are taken from the Istat’s (2006a, 
2006b) multipurpose survey. 
A PCA is performed on ten indicators of the intensity and quality of family relationships. The first 
factorial plan explains the 67% of the variation of the data. PCA’s results reveal an interesting 
multidimensionality: the first axis is significantly and positively correlated with the indicators of 
family size, spatial proximity, and the frequency of encounters, and can thus be seen as a good 
measure for the intensity of family ties. The second axis is significantly and positively correlated 
with the willingness to take care of grandchildren, the custom of gift exchange, and the declared 
satisfaction with family relationships, and can thus be interpreted as a proxy for the quality of 
family relationships. Eigenvalues and factor loadings are reported in tables C3 and C4 in Appendix 
C. A possible interpretation is that too tight ties could turn into “bonds” leading to the reiteration of 
mechanic behaviours which not necessarily reflect a higher readiness to help one’s family members. 
However,  higher  scores  on  the  first  factor  are  likely  to  be  connected  with  a  strong  cultural 
commitment to traditional family formation and, thus, to reproduction.  
Model  results  are  reported  in  Table  4.  The  intensity  of  family  ties  is  indeed  significantly  and 
positively  associated  with  couples  childbearing  intentions.  By  contrast,  the  quality  of  family 
relationships is not statistically significant. Women’s labour instability is confirmed as a significant   14 
and strong factor discouraging motherhood. The importance of precariousness is thus robust to 
different model specifications. 
As in previous sections, regressions have been controlled for home ownership, home’s surface, the 
fact of having debts (in particular home loans), the state of health, the sector of activity, and the 
self-declared wealth. Moreover, in this section, we controlled for a series of territorial indicators 
aimed at capturing the labour market conditions (e.g. unemployment rate, female employment rate, 
female  young unemployment rate, self-employed women rate, black labour, and  gender  gap in 
labour participation), taken from the Istat’s (2006c) quarterly survey on the labour force. All these 
variables were not statistically significant or, in some cases, they were significant but the size of 
their effect was negligible. 
 
 
Table 4. Model results 
  Model 5 
  Coef.  z  P > | z | 
Married  .9687911  4.78  0.000 
Number of children  -.6076464  -11.57  0.000 
Man’s age  -.0410371  -6.81  0.000 
Woman’s age  -.0378606  -6.29  0.000 
Man’s education  .107253  2.92  0.004 
Woman’s education  .02863  0.77  0.443 
Precarious man  -.1249236  -0.82  0.412 
Precarious woman  -.4222994  -3.27  0.001 
Perceived Economic well-being  .1281479  3.05  0.002 
Intensity of family ties  .064552  3.06  0.002 
Quality of family ties  -.0220974  -0.47  0.640 
Observations  1742 
Degrees of freedom  11 
Log-likelihood   -543.44962 





Besides confirming the reliability of conventional explanations like civil status, age, and economic 
well-being,  the  empirical  analysis  in  this  paper  contradicts  some  of  the  statements  of 
microeconomic theory and supports an alternative explanation of the postponement of childbearing 
with few precedents in the literature: the instability of females’ work status. In the Italian labour 
market, being a precarious worker is a strong dissuasive deterrent from planning a motherhood. The 
theoretical predictions according to which female participation may be responsible for the fall in 
fertility are not supported by data. On the contrary, unemployed women, far from being encouraged   15 
to childbearing by the lower opportunity cost of leaving the labour market, are definitely less likely 
to plan to have children.  
These findings add some interesting insights to the debate on the fall in fertility. As outlined in the 
review  of  the  literature,  many  authors  have  properly  related  the  “Italian  puzzle”,  i.e.  the 
combination of low female participation with very low fertility, to differences in the institutional 
and policy framework. In Nordic countries, where more generous policies on parental arrangements 
and childcare assistance have been implemented, the negative correlation between participation and 
fertility has in fact been reversed. These studies suggest the creation of more part-time jobs and the 
improvement of childcare assistance as possible ways to fill the gap (Del Boca and Sauer, 2009, Del 
Boca et al., 2009). Here we argue that public actions aimed at raising fertility should take into 
account also appropriate labour market policies. In the Italian labour market, workers’ flexibility 
essentially  means  their  precariousness.  Precarious  workers  have  low-paid  jobs,  with  scarce  or 
nonexistent guarantees in terms of sickness and parental benefits, career prospects and training 
opportunities.  Everyday-life  experience  widely  suggests  that  one  of  the  decisive  questions  that 
employers  pose  to  female  candidates  in  interviews  refers  to  their  civil  status  and  childbearing 
intentions. Temporary female workers are well aware that in most cases a pregnancy would be a 
cause of termination of the work relationship by the employer. The resulting trade-off may be 
unsustainable, both in terms of women’s life-satisfaction and of the economic well-being of the 
couple.  
The  demographic  consequences  of  this  phenomenon  are  doomed  to  become  more  and  more 
important as the share of precarious workers in the labour market constantly grows. The scenario is 
worsened by the dramatic population ageing, which weakens the economic system’s ability to face 
the global competition and blights the sustainability of the pension system. 
In such a context, labour market policies alleviating the precariousness of temporary workers would 
probably lead to more balanced choices in terms of family planning and labour market participation.  
Another interesting insight which this paper adds to the debate refers to the role of bonding social 
capital. The strength of family ties is negatively correlated with an indicator of their quality, and is 
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Appendix A. Labour market indicators 
The index of educational qualification ranges from 1 to 8. Categories are sorted in ascending order 
from the lowest level of education. Codes are as follows: 1 = no education; 2 = primary school 
certificate; 3 = lower secondary school certificate; 4 = vocational secondary school diploma (3 
years of study); 5 = upper secondary school diploma; 6 = 3-year university degree/higher education 
diploma; 7 = 5-year university degree; 8 = postgraduate qualification. 
The index of participation to the labour market is obtained from the intervieewes responses to two 
questions: 
1) “Was (name) employed in 2006? That is, was he/she in paid employment?”, where possible 
responses where: 1) blue-collar worker or similar (including employees and apprentices, 
homeworkers and sales assistants); 2) office worker; 3) school teacher in any type of school 
(including teachers with term appointments, those under special contracts and similar); 4) 
junior/middle manager; 5) senior manager, senior official, school head, director of studies, 
university teacher, magistrate; 6) member of profession; 7) small employer; 8) own-account 
worker/craft worker; 9) owner or member of family business; 10) working shareholder/partner; 11) 
contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional collaborator, project worker, etc.); 12) 
first-job seeker; 13) unemployed; 14) homemaker (i.e. housewife or househusband; 15) independent 
means; 16) retired worker; 17) pensioner (disability/survivor’s pension/old-age welfare benefits);   19 
18) student (from primary school up); 19) pre-school-age child; 20) other non-employed (e.g. 
conscript/volunteer/disabled). 
2) “Which was the type of your contract?”. This question was posed only to employees and possible 
responses were: 1) permanent; 2) fixed-term; 3) temporary. 
As stated in section 5.1, the type of contract plays a fundamental role for two main reasons: a) as 
outlined in Section 3, diverse types of contract imply strong differences in terms of  risks of job 
loss, wage variability, intermittent unemployment, training opportunities, workplace conditions, 
parental benefits, and other guarantees; b) a difference in the type of contract may play a crucial 
role in determining the opportunity cost of childbearing as defined by microeconomic theory. 
 
 
Table A1. Index of labour market participation 
Value  Categories 
1  Homemakers, students, others non-employed, unemployed, independent means, 
retired, pensioners. 
2  First job seekers*. 
3 
Atypical workers (i.e. contingent worker on own account (regular or occasional 
collaborator, project worker, etc.), blue-collar workers, office workers, and school 
teachers with temporary contracts. 
4  Blue-collar workers, office workers, and school teachers with fixed-term contracts, 
junior/middle managers with temporary contracts. 
5 
Blue-collar workers, office workers, and school teachers with permanent contracts, 
junior/middle managers with fixed-term contracts, senior managers, senior officials, 
school heads, directors of studies, university teachers, magistrates with temporary 
contracts. 
6  Senior managers, senior officials, school heads, directors of studies, university 
teachers, magistrates with fixed-term contracts. 
7  Junior/middle managers with permanent contracts. 
8 
Senior managers, senior officials, school heads, directors of studies, university 
teachers, magistrates with permanent contracts, members of profession, small 
employers, own-account workers/craft workers, owners or members of family 
business, working shareholders/partners**. 
* We assume that first-job seekers involvement in the labour market is quite higher in respect 
of that of unemployed because, on average, they are younger and hold higher educational 
qualification. Thus, their job search actions are likely to be informed by higher expectations in 
terms of income and position. Anyway, estimates do not change if we include first-job seekers 
in category “2”. 
** Members of profession, small employers, own-account workers/craft workers, owners or 
members of family business, working shareholders/partners are all considered as self-employed 
and included in the highest category. 
 
 
Appendix B. Goodness of fit 
The LR Chi-square for model (1) is 419.45 which is higher than the critical value for 10 degrees of 
freedom at any reasonable significance level.    20 
The pseudo R2 for model 1 is 0.2767, which is comparable with those obtained in the literature. 
The LR Chi-square for model 2 (8 degrees of freedom) is 431.21 which is higher than the critical 
value for 10 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 2 is 0.3009. 
The LR Chi-square for model 3 (16 degrees of freedom) is 435.95 which is higher than the critical 
value for 10 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 3 is 0.2876. 
The LR Chi-square for model 4 (14 degrees of freedom) is 438.55 which is higher than the critical 
value for 18 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 4 is 0.2893. 
The LR Chi-square for model 5 (11 degrees of freedom) is 429.16, which is higher than the critical 
value for 11 degrees of freedom at any reasonable significance level. 
The Pseudo R2 for model 5 is 0.2831. 
 
Appendix C. Social capital indicators 
 
 
Table C1. Indicators of the intensity of family ties 
Label  Variable 
FAMSINGL  Singles families for every 100 families of the same area. 
COPFIG  Couples with children, for every 100 families of the 
same area. 
N_COMPFAM  Average number of members of the household. 
FAMAGGR  Households including more than one family uunit for 
every 100 families of the same area. 
BAMBOCC 
Not  married  people  between  18  and  34  living  with  a 
parent for every 100 people with the same age living in 
the same area. 
MAD_1KMTOT 
People  having  their  mother  living  within  1  km 
(cohabitants or not) for every 100 people whose mother 
is alive. 
VEDMUMTG  People  meeting  their  mother  everyday  for  every  100 
people with non-cohabitant mother of the same area. 
 
 
Since the frequency of encounters and spatial proximity between to different family members 
exhibit a strong correlation, when not collinearity (e.g., the encounters with the mother are collinear 
with the encounters with the father), we preferred to retain measures referring to just one member, 
the mother, instead of taking into account also fathers, sons, brothers, and sisters.  
   21 
 
Table C2. Indicators of the quality of family ties 
Etichetta  Variabile 
NOBABYSIT 
People over 35 who have not cohabitants grandchildren under 13 
who never take care of them for every 100 people with not 
cohabitants grandchildren living in the same area.  
REGALI 
Families with at least two people whose members are used to 
exchange non monetary gifts for every 100 families living in the 
same area.  
SODFAMI 
People  aged  14  and  more  declaring  themselves  satisfied  of 






Table C3. Eigenvalues 
Axis  Eigenvalues  Percentage  Cumulated 
percentage 
1  5,2672  52,67  52,67 
2  1,4337  14,34  67,01 
3  1,1271  11,27  78,28 




Factor Loadings and Variables Correlations with the first five Axes 
Variable  Axis  1  Axis  2  Axis  3  Axis  4  Axis  5 
SODFAMI  -0,15  0,17  0,94  -0,15  -0,07 
FAMSINGL  -0,85  0,41  -0,03  -0,08  -0,25 
FAMAGGR  0,05  -0,95  0,14  0,17  -0,04 
COPFIGL  0,91  0,17  0,05  0,16  0,13 
N_COMPFA  0,95  -0,17  0,12  0,17  0,08 
BAMBOCC  0,84  -0,02  0,11  0,06  -0,43 
MAD_1KMT  0,93  0,19  0,22  -0,02  -0,05 
VEDMUMTG  0,71  0,15  -0,04  -0,54  0,32 
NOBABYSI  0,60  0,43  -0,23  0,49  -0,08 
REGALI  -0,60  0,18  0,31  0,58  0,32 
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